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Abstract 
 
This study explores optimal pricing strategies in 
games and other interactive digital goods under 
incomplete information, when bundling is an option. 
Drawing from research on the pricing of information 
goods, we propose a pattern of optimal pricing 
strategies in which hedonic characteristics affect the 
utility of interactive digital goods and services. This is 
a new approach to games, to treat them as a service to 
determine pricing strategies. Findings reveal that 
there is an optimal pricing solution for firms in the 
gaming industry. This finding holds both in bundling 
and non-bundling cases. 
Utilizing analytical modeling methodology, we 
propose pricing-inspired business strategies to the 
firms operating in the digital gaming industry. Our 
findings could also be applied to other hedonic 
interactive digital goods and services. Overall, this 
study contributes to the existing pricing theories in 
digital services and information goods. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Content release strategy of the gaming industry 
was almost identical to the physical goods prior to the 
internet era. For example, once Super Mario is 
released, all the game content is packed into a fixed 
package, and the players did not get any new content 
until Super Mario 2 cartridge is released (see figure 1.) 
This strategy seems to be constrained by technology 
of the game production rather than by business 
motives. Moreover, connecting a digital service to a 
physical good made it easier to utilize conventional 
pricing models. Nowadays, game developers can 
release new content to players whenever they want. 
Many mobile apps or online games release new 
updates in a matter of weeks, or even days. Given this 
flexibility, determining optimized pricing and content 
release strategies based on business motives has 
become an important decision. 
 
One of the most important motives for the game 
developer to release new contents of the game is to 
balance between getting desirable content delivered 
and minimizing the annoyance caused to players. It is 
obvious that game developers have the incentive to 
deliver desirable content to players. Frequent release 
of new content provides new excitement to players, 
and invoke in game purchasing. For the annoyance 
caused to players, it is not only referring to the hassle 
caused by frequency update notifications, it also 
includes the cost incurred when players are trying to 
get used to the new contents or user interfaces. In 
addition, frequent additions could complicate the 
game. It could potentially harm in game social 
interactions and deter new players [1]. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Super Mario Series Cartridges 
 
 
Our study aims to model this trade-off caused 
frequent updates to generate revenue. We also 
investigate how social interactions among gamers 
could affect the developers’ optimal decision. Of 
course, in practice, this analytical model should be 
tested with empirical estimates so that we can know 
more about how exactly the model works for different 
types of games or different player pools. 
 
The main contribution of this research study is to 
clarify how several important mechanisms, which are 
well known to the game developers, work together in 
an economic model. For example, the game difficulty 
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has to be at the correct level because if the game is too 
difficult, it could deter new players. On the other hand, 
if it is too easy, competitive players may leave. Also, 
if the developers release new content too frequently 
user do not have enough time to get used to them. Yet, 
without new releases, the developer cannot response 
to user’s preference accordingly. Leveraging the 
nature of social interaction in the game makes it easier 
for the players to learn about the new content and gain 
the most out of it. None of these mechanisms is foreign 
to the game industry. However, it is because these 
mechanisms interact and affect each other, putting 
them together makes the whole system very 
complicated to analysis without a formal model. By 
building an economic model with rational agent, we 
can apply the tools we use in economics to learn about 
to how the above mechanisms work. 
 
Our analytical model also provides insight to 
operational decisions (such as when and how much a 
game developer should release new content.) In 
addition, if they can release new content to a particular 
group of players, how they should pick those players. 
We hope that the model will provide us with a tool to 
hint the answer to these questions and hint how the 
decision be affected by the nature of player pool, size 
of game, nature of game, companies’ fame, and the 
cost of producing new contents.  
 
Understanding the optimal content release 
frequency is important for the game developers 
provide good user experience for players. Our 
preliminary investigation revealed that there is 
substantial amount of comments in Google Play and 
Apple App Store declaring the annoyance caused by 
too frequent updates. In addition, there are even more 
comments concerning not enough new content when 
we are looking at the game-associated forums. 
 
Finally, our analytical model hints the direction of 
how making use of game data to improve bundling 
decisions. As mentioned before, social interaction 
plays an important role in determining optimal content 
release strategy. Therefore, with the proper measure of 
the degree of social interactions and other 
characteristics of the game, we can determine the 
strategy better. Big-data researchers in the gaming 
industry can also benefit from this model. The insight 
we get from an economic model can help us to narrow 
down what we should be looking at in the sea of game 
data. 
 
In the recent years, online games and software as a 
service have been popular research topics. However, 
to our knowledge, this is the first paper investigating 
pricing strategies games as a service. 
 
2. Literature Review  
 
Contemporary games typically utilize cloud-
computing technologies. The gaming industry has 
been embracing cloud computing because of its 
reduced operational costs, flexibility, scalability, rapid 
deployment, remote access and mobility, access to 
innovation, efficient use of computing resources, and 
green computing [2]. Cloud computing has three 
service models: Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), 
Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Software as a 
Service (SaaS). Conventional digital games are 
moving from away from physical software packages 
(i.e., Cartridges and disks) to SaaS platforms. The new 
SaaS based gaming platform is called cloud gaming, 
or games as a service (GaaS) [3]. 
 
SaaS is not only a popular for gaming services, but 
it also drives the overall growth of the cloud 
computing industry. In 2016, SaaS applications 
generated more than half of the cloud computing 
industry revenue [4]. 
 
This study investigates the impact of interactive 
digital goods pricing strategies on the sales revenues 
of GaaS products. Therefore, this section discusses the 
prior studies on price discount-based pricing and 
bundling strategies. 
 
2.1 SaaS – GaaS Intersection 
 
Cloud computing, particularly SaaS, has been a 
popular research topic in the last decade [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 
10]. Numerous studies have presented definitions of 
major concepts, systems structures, stakeholders, and 
technologies, as well as potential future research 
topics in the cloud computing area [2, 4, 9]. However, 
GaaS is rarely discussed in cloud computing research 
primarily because it is covered under SaaS and other 
emerging technology categories. Discussion of these 
“emerging technology” classifications is essential for 
information systems research as the managerial 
aspects of cloud computing enhances capabilities and 
performance of the information technology (IT) 
artifact [11]. 
 
An alternative key study pillar of cloud computing 
research is to discuss new gaming technologies that 
can be offered through SaaS category. The overview 
of GaaS is essential to investigate these new 
technologies and capabilities related to cloud 
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computing and provide an overarching picture for the 
pricing of these emerging technologies [2, 12]. 
 
Prior research has already addressed perception, 
adoption, privacy and security issues regarding the 
SaaS concept [13, 14, 15], yet we were not able to 
identify any studies on business models or pricing 
research on SaaS.  
 
2.2 Pricing Strategies 
 
Game pricing strategies include bundling and price 
discounts. Price discount is so essential, most popular 
and effective pricing strategy employed to increase 
sales is freemium. Giving away the initial product free 
affects the evaluation of gamers on product utility [16, 
17]. Contemporary literature has shown a positive 
impact of the price discount promotion on the gamer’s 
value perception of the product, intention to purchase 
and purchase behavior, as well as the revenue 
performance of the seller. Impulse buying also has a 
predominant effect on sales increase, and it has been 
investigated in a number of digital goods domains [16, 
18].  
 
The ubiquitous property of the GaaS domain has 
unsurprisingly expanded the gaming market. Mobile 
games are the highest-earning segment in the SaaS 
domain when direct and indirect revenues are 
considered. For example, the steady increase in the 
number of mobile phone users playing online games 
have been and easily observable in our classrooms. In 
addition, ad-hoc surveys we conducted over the years 
indicates that gamers are getting more and more 
comfortable for paying for bundled services and 
freemium digital interactive goods [4]. 
 
Recent seminal articles we identified in the pricing 
of bundling products mainly utilized empirical 
methods such as Mishra and Mishra [19]. However, 
there has been earlier studies that used analytical 
modeling [20]. Despite these relevant studies, 
anecdotally, we observed that practitioners lack 
analytical pricing and bundling strategies in the GaaS 
domain. Perhaps, this is because prior studies on 
discount-based pricing and bundling strategies 
focused their impact on the perceived value of 
products and the buying intention of gamers rather 
than hedonic properties of games and other digital 
goods. 
 
3. Model  
 
We characterize game markets with a competitive 
classical two period model with a j number of 
offerings. Initially, competing firms start with 
asymmetric market shares, which is more realistic than 
identical market shares. Next, we use this model to 
investigate how prices and market shares would 
change over time and to explain strategies for 
advanced strategies that include bundling of GaaS 
offerings. Figure 2, demonstrates the nature of our 
gaming market. 
 
 
Figure 2: Market Structure in the Game Market Model 
 
 
Beyond the classical model, we expand the market 
with GaaS services and time-inconsistent behavior. 
 
The notation used in this paper is in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Notation 
Term Definition 
u Gamer’s utility 
i Firm index: i ∈ {a, b} 
t Period: t ∈ {0,1,2} 
𝑐𝑠 Cost of switching: 𝑐𝑠 ~ U[0, θ]  
j GaaS index for bundling: j  {1, 2, 3, …} 
e Network effect on u 
α Marginal shifting cost  
𝑝𝑡
𝑖
 Price of firm i in period t 
𝑞𝑡
𝑖
 Quantity sold by firm i in period t 
 
The gaming market are served by two firms (𝑎 and 
𝑏) with asymmetric initial market shares: 
 
0 ≤ 𝑞0
𝑏 < 0.5 < 𝑞0
𝑎 ≤ 1 
 
The asymmetric market share assumption benefits 
the model in two ways. First, it provides a more 
realistic representation of current GaaS markets. 
Second, it covers a wider range of theoretical scenarios 
than an equal-market-share case. 
 
Firm 
A
Game 
1
Game 
2
Game 
3
...
Game j
Firm 
B
Game 
1
Game 
2
Game 
3
...
Game j
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We also assume that, in the market setting above, 
there is a continuum of gamers uniformly distributed 
between firms a and b. This horizontal differentiation 
(which indicates that GaaS characteristics across 
games are fixed) is due to inherent characteristics of 
GaaS (such as gamer taste, ease of operation, 
configurability, compatibility and security perception) 
rather than the physical location.  
 
3.1 Basic Model 
 
We consider a one-shot game theoretical model in 
which firms commit prices p1, p2. Gamers make 
purchase decisions based on their hedonic utilities. Let 
𝑝𝑡
𝑖  represent the price of firm i in period t. The term 𝑥𝑖 
is the distance of the gamer from buying firm i. The 
indifferent gamer for firm a in the second period can 
be characterized as: 
 
𝑢 − 𝛼𝑥𝑎 − 𝑝2
𝑎 = 𝑢 − 𝛼(1 − 𝑥𝑎 ) − 𝑝2
𝑏 − 𝑠  
 
This indifferent gamer boundary determines new 
market shares for firm a and b at the end of the second 
period. In the cloud computing industry, utility is 
derived from using per unit of service but in the 
baseline model, we do not allow for differentiated 
services. 
 
We use backward induction to find equilibrium 
prices and quantities sold to represent market shares. 
Our primary goal is to determine if there is an optimal 
solution for firm revenues and pricing. 
 
Firm b’s indifferent gamer is: 
 
𝑢 − 𝛼(1 − 𝑥𝑏 ) − 𝑝2
𝑏 = 𝑢 − 𝛼𝑥𝑏 − 𝑝2
𝑎 − 𝑠  
 
We can determine the new allocation of the market 
shares for firm a and b at the end of the second period 
by finding the quantity of switching gamers. To find 
second term market shares in terms of second period 
prices, we start with switching costs: 
 
𝑠𝑎 = 𝛼(2𝑥𝑎 − 1) + 𝑝2
𝑎 − 𝑝2
𝑏 
 
𝑠𝑏 = 𝛼(1 − 2𝑥𝑏 ) − 𝑝2
𝑎 + 𝑝2
𝑏 
 
Let 𝑛𝑡
𝑗𝑘
 be the quantity of gamers who bought from 
k in period t-1, and firm j in period t. For example, 
gamers who switched to firm b from firm a in period 2 
are represented as 𝑛2
𝑏𝑎. 
 
Gamers staying with firm a: 
 
𝑛2
𝑎𝑎 = ∫ ( ∫
1
𝜃
𝜃
𝛼(2𝑥−1)+𝑝2
𝑎−𝑝2
𝑏
𝑑𝑠) 𝑑𝑥
𝑞1
0
 
 
=
𝑞1(𝛼(1 − 𝑞𝑖1) − 𝑝2
𝑎 + 𝑝2
𝑏 + 𝜃)
𝜃
 
Gamers switching from firm a to firm b: 
 
𝑛2
𝑏𝑎 = 𝑞1 − 𝑛2
𝑎𝑎  
 
=
𝑞1(𝛼(𝑞𝑖1 − 1) + 𝑝2
𝑎 − 𝑝2
𝑏)
𝜃
 
 
Gamers staying with firm b: 
 
𝑛2
𝑏𝑏 = ∫ ( ∫
1
𝜃
𝜃
𝛼(1−2𝑥)−𝑝2
𝑎+𝑝2
𝑏
𝑑𝑠) 𝑑𝑥
1
𝑞1
 
 
=
(1 − 𝑞1)(𝛼𝑞1 + 𝑝2
𝑎 − 𝑝2
𝑏 + 𝜃)
𝜃
 
 
 
Gamers switching from firm b to firm a: 
 
𝑛2
𝑎𝑏 = 1 − 𝑞1 − 𝑛2
𝑏𝑏 
 
=
(𝑞1 − 1)(𝛼𝑞1 + 𝑝2
𝑎 − 𝑝2
𝑏)
𝜃
 
 
Market share for firm a at the end of period 2: 
 
𝑞2
𝑎 = 𝑛2
𝑎𝑎 + 𝑛2
𝑎𝑏 
 
= 𝑞1 +
𝑝2
𝑏 − 𝑝2
𝑎
𝜃
 
 
Market share for firm b at the end of period 2: 
 
𝑞2
𝑏 = 𝑛2
𝑏𝑏 + 𝑛2
𝑏𝑎 
 
= 1 − 𝑞1 +
𝑝2
𝑎 − 𝑝2
𝑏
𝜃
 
 
Firm j maximizes its second period profit. 
 
max
𝑝
 𝜋2
𝑗 = 𝑝2
𝑗𝑞2
𝑗
 
 
First order conditions give us equilibrium prices 
as: 
 
𝑝2
𝑎∗ =
(1 + 𝑞1)𝜃
3
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=
(2 − 𝑞1)𝜃
3
 
 
Equilibrium quantities sold are: 
 
𝑞2
𝑎∗ =
(1 + 𝑞1)
3
 
 
=
(2 − 𝑞1)
3
 
 
As a result of the profit maximization where 
gamers may switch, we obtain second period profits as 
a function of quantities sold in the first period: 
 
𝜋2
𝑎∗ =
(1 + 𝑞1)
2𝜃
9
 
 
𝜋2
𝑏∗ =
(2 − 𝑞1)
2𝜃
9
 
 
Next, we follow the same procedure for period 1. 
First, we identify the indifferent gamers to find 
switching costs si in terms of  𝑥𝑖
𝑗
 and prices. Then we 
solve the maximization problem for the first period 
profits to find equilibrium prices and quantities sold.  
 
Total profits can be found as a function of initial 
quantities sold and switching costs: 
 
𝜋1
𝑎∗ =
(13 + 9𝑞0)(5𝜃 + 7𝑞0𝜃)
529
 
 
𝜋1
𝑏∗ =
(10 − 9𝑞0)(18𝜃 − 7𝑞0𝜃)
529
 
 
Theorem 1: There exists a solution for the 
maximum revenue in single-game GaaS markets, thus 
there are rational pricing strategies for firms 𝑎 and 𝑏. 
This is a unique equilibrium where firms 𝑎 and 𝑏 
pursue rational strategies and gamers purchase in 
equilibrium. 
 
One of the main objectives of any firm is the 
market share. Obviously, the ultimate market shares 
for firm a and b depends on initially sold units but 
interestingly they approximate each other regardless 
of the initial value.  
 
3.2 Bundle Model 
 
In our model setup, there are i firms in j games of 
the market. Gaming markets develop over time, 
generally with the introduction of a disruptive 
technology because network externalities require time 
to affect a market. For example, it took Nintendo years 
to develop a GaaS enabled ecosystem and benefit from 
hedonic characteristics of online interactive services 
(device and GaaS) of the gaming market. Therefore, 
most game markets start with independent GaaS firms 
serving each game. The best representation of a pre-
competition gamer market is the case where firms 
independently serve separate games to the market. In 
short, in the basic model, we consider that bundling 
externalities do not come into effect. On the other 
hand, information goods inherently exhibit network 
externalities within a market [21]. Therefore, in the 
basic model we consider GaaS to exhibit delayed 
positive network externalities despite the fact that 
cross-market externalities do not exist. 
 
We consider a two-period pricing game with two 
firms. Price 𝑝𝑡
𝑖  represents the price of firm 𝑖 in period 
𝑡. Gamers make purchase decisions based on their 
utilities. The term x𝑖  is the distance of the gamer 
buying the service from firm 𝑖. In addition, the term 
cs represents any costs incurred to switch. The initial 
picture looks as shown in figure 3: 
 
 
Figure 3. Illustration of the basic model 
 
For simplicity, we denote 𝑒11 as e, and omit the 
subscript 𝑗 in 𝑝𝑗𝑡
𝑖  and 𝑞𝑗𝑡
𝑖 . The net utility of the 
indifferent gamer for firm a in the second period can 
be characterized as: 
 
𝑢 − 𝛼𝑥𝑎 − 𝑝2
𝑎 + 𝑒𝑞1
𝑎 = 
𝑢 − 𝛼(1 − 𝑥𝑎) − 𝑝2
𝑏 − 𝑐𝑠
𝑎 + 𝑒𝑞1
𝑏 
 
The indifferent gamer determines new market 
shares for firm 𝑎 and 𝑏 at the end of the second period. 
 
We use backward induction to find equilibrium 
prices and quantities sold to represent market shares. 
First, we start with the second period solution, and 
then we solve the maximization problem for the first 
period profits to find equilibrium prices and quantities 
𝑎 𝑏 
𝑞0
𝑏  𝑞0
𝑎  
0 1 
𝑎 𝑏 
𝑞0
𝑏  𝑞0
𝑎  
0 1 
G
am
e 1
 
𝑒1𝑗 = 0 
G
am
e j 
𝑒11 > 0 
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sold. As mentioned in table 1, 𝑞𝑡
𝑖 denotes quantity sold 
by firm 𝑖 in period 𝑡. 
 
The net utility of firm 𝑏’s indifferent gamer in the 
second period is: 
 
𝑢 − 𝛼(1 − 𝑥𝑏) − 𝑝2
𝑏 + 𝑒𝑞1
𝑎 = 
𝑢 − 𝛼𝑥𝑏 − 𝑝2
𝑎 − 𝑐𝑠
𝑏 + 𝑒𝑞1
𝑏 
 
We can determine the new allocation of market 
share for firm 𝑎 and 𝑏 at the end of the second period 
by determining the quantity of switching gamers. To 
find market shares for the second term, we start by 
identifying gamers who switch: 
 
Gamers will switch from firm 𝑎 to firm 𝑏 when 
𝑐𝑠
𝑎 < α(2xa − 1) + p2
a − p2
b + 𝑒(𝑞1
𝑏 − 𝑞1
𝑎). 
Similarly, firm 𝑏 gamers switch to firm 𝑎 when 𝑐𝑠
𝑏 <
𝛼(1 − 2𝑥𝑏) − 𝑝2
𝑎 + 𝑝2
𝑏 + 𝑒(𝑞1
𝑏 − 𝑞1
𝑎). Please note 
that switching cost can be different for each gamer 
since it is a distribution. Such switching costs bring 
additional trade-offs over the heterogeneity of tastes. 
For example, consider two gamers where one is closer 
to firm 𝑎 in tastes. Normally we would expect the 
closer gamer to stay with firm 𝑎 and the farther gamer 
to switch, however, if the closer gamer’s switching 
cost is low, and the farther gamer’s switching cost is 
high, then the farther gamer can stay with the firm 
because of high switching costs and the closer gamer 
may switch to the rival’s service. 
 
We assume that 𝛼 < 𝑝2
𝑎 − 𝑝2
𝑏 to avoid the negative 
probability of switching and an interior location 𝑥 for 
the gamer. This assumption not only improves 
tractability in the general model, but also it is a better 
representation of reality. Price 𝑝 in our model includes 
inherent penalties of switching, therefore a gamer’s 
switching cost will be less than the price difference, or 
else the gamer would not switch. These conditions are 
checked for all possible cases (negative and positive) 
of optimal solutions. 
 
Let 𝑛𝑡𝑗
𝑘𝑙  be the quantity of gamers who bought from 
𝑙 in period 𝑡 − 1, and firm k in period 𝑡, in market 
game j. For example, gamers who switched to firm 𝑏 
from firm 𝑎 in period 2 are represented as 𝑛2𝑗
𝑏𝑎. 
Therefore, gamers staying with firm 𝑎 can be found 
through the following calculation: 
 
𝑛2𝑗
𝑎𝑎 = ∫ ( ∫
1
𝜃
𝜃
𝛼(2𝑥−1)+𝑝2
𝑎−𝑝2
𝑏+𝑒(𝑞1
𝑏−𝑞1
𝑎)
𝑑𝑠) 𝑑𝑥
𝑞1
𝑎
0
 
 
=
𝑞1
𝑎(𝛼(1 − 𝑞1
𝑎) − 𝑝2
𝑎 + 𝑝2
𝑏 + 𝑒(𝑞1
𝑎 − 𝑞1
𝑏) + 𝜃)
𝜃
 
 
Gamers switching from firm 𝑎 to 𝑏: 
 
𝑛2𝑗
𝑏𝑎 = 𝑞1
𝑎 − 𝑛2𝑗
𝑎𝑎 
 
=
𝑞1
𝑎(𝛼(𝑞1
𝑎 − 1) + 𝑝2
𝑎 − 𝑝2
𝑏 − 𝑒(𝑞1
𝑎 − 𝑞1
𝑏))
𝜃
 
 
Gamers staying with firm 𝑏: 
 
𝑛2𝑗
𝑏𝑏 = ∫ ( ∫
1
𝜃
𝜃
𝛼(1−2𝑥)−𝑝2
𝑎+𝑝2
𝑏+𝑒(𝑞1
𝑏−𝑞1
𝑎)
𝑑𝑠) 𝑑𝑥
1
𝑞1
𝑎
 
 
=
(𝑞1
𝑎 − 1)(𝑞1
𝑎(𝛼 + 𝑒) − 𝑞1
𝑏𝑒 + 𝑝2
𝑎 − 𝑝2
𝑏 + 𝜃)
𝜃
 
 
Gamers switching from firm 𝑏 to firm 𝑎: 
 
𝑛2
𝑎𝑏 = 1 − 𝑞1
𝑎 − 𝑛2
𝑏𝑏 
 
=
(𝑞1
𝑎 − 1)(𝑞1
𝑎(𝛼 + 𝑒) − 𝑞1
𝑏𝑒 + 𝑝2
𝑎 − 𝑝2
𝑏)
𝜃
 
 
Market share for firm 𝑎 at the end of period 2: 
 
𝑞2
𝑎 = 𝑛2
𝑎𝑎 + 𝑛2
𝑎𝑏 
 
= 𝑞1
𝑎 +
𝑝2
𝑏 − 𝑝2
𝑎 + 𝑒(2𝑞1
𝑎 − 1)(𝑞1
𝑎 − 𝑞1
𝑏)
𝜃
 
 
Market share for firm 𝑏 at the end of period 2: 
 
𝑞2
𝑏 = 𝑛2
𝑏𝑏 + 𝑛2
𝑏𝑎 
 
= 1 − 𝑞1
𝑎 +
𝑝2
𝑎 − 𝑝2
𝑏 − 𝑒(2𝑞1
𝑎 − 1)(𝑞1
𝑎 − 𝑞1
𝑏)
𝜃
 
 
Firm 𝑖 maximizes its second period profit. 
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑝
 𝜋2
𝑖 = 𝑝2
𝑖 𝑞2
𝑖  
 
First order conditions give us equilibrium prices 
as: 
 
𝑝2
𝑎∗ =
(1 + 𝑞1
𝑎)𝜃 + 𝑒(2𝑞1
𝑎 − 1)(𝑞1
𝑎 − 𝑞1
𝑏)
3
 
 
𝑝2
𝑏∗ =
(2 − 𝑞1
𝑎)𝜃 − 𝑒(2𝑞1
𝑎 − 1)(𝑞1
𝑎 − 𝑞1
𝑏)
3
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Equilibrium quantities sold are: 
 
𝑞2
𝑎∗ =
(1 + 𝑞1
𝑎)
3
+
𝑒(2𝑞1
𝑎 − 1)(𝑞1
𝑎 − 𝑞1
𝑏)
3𝜃
 
 
𝑞2
𝑏∗ =
(2 − 𝑞1
𝑎)
3
+
𝑒(2𝑞1
𝑎 − 1)(𝑞1
𝑎 − 𝑞1
𝑏)
3𝜃
 
 
As a result of the second period profit 
maximization, we obtain profits as a function of 
quantities sold in the first period: 
 
π2
a∗ =
(𝑒(2𝑞1
𝑎 − 1)(𝑞1
𝑎 − 𝑞1
𝑏) + (1 + q1
a)θ)2
9θ
 
 
π2
b∗ =
(𝑒(2𝑞1
𝑎 − 1)(𝑞1
𝑎 − 𝑞1
𝑏) − (2 − q1
a)θ)2
9θ
 
 
For the first period maximization problem, we 
follow a process similar to the second period. First, we 
identify the indifferent gamers to find switching costs 
𝑐𝑠 in terms of  𝑥
𝑖 and prices. 
 
The net utility of the indifferent gamer for firm 𝑎 
in the first period is: 
 
𝑢 − 𝛼𝑥𝑎 − 𝑝1
𝑎 + 𝑒𝑞1
𝑎 = 
𝑢 − 𝛼(1 − 𝑥𝑎) − 𝑝1
𝑏 − 𝑐𝑠 + 𝑒𝑞1
𝑏 
 
The net utility of firm 𝑏’s indifferent gamer is: 
 
𝑢 − 𝛼(1 − 𝑥𝑏) − 𝑝1
𝑏 + 𝑒𝑞1
𝑎 = 
𝑢 − 𝛼𝑥𝑏 − 𝑝1
𝑎 − 𝑐𝑠 + 𝑒𝑞1
𝑏 
 
Subsequently, we solve the maximization problem 
for the first period profits to find equilibrium prices 
and quantities sold. Tracing previous steps shows that 
there are optimal pricing strategies for firm 𝑎 and 𝑏 in 
the basic model. 
 
Theorem 2: There exists a solution for the 
maximum revenue in bundled GaaS markets, thus 
there are rational pricing strategies for firms 𝑎 and 𝑏. 
 
3.3 Pricing with GaaS Externalities 
 
Under the assumption that positive network 
externalities are present across GaaS, we introduce a 
more sophisticated parameter e. In this case, 𝑒ℎ𝑗 
represents the delayed positive network externalities 
of the quantity sold in market game h on market game 
j. This externality means that the utility of the gamer 
benefits from a compatible game sold in a connected 
market. For example, when a firm such as Nintendo 
sells an online game service, it has the potential to 
affect sales of complementary digital goods and 
services. Complementary service offerings and social 
characteristics of collaborative games increase the 
utility for the gamer. This benefit creates value both 
for the user playing a single game and for the gamer 
using bundled services. 
 
The main challenge for such a platform is to get the 
pricing right. In our second case, we develop a pricing 
strategy when cross-market externalities are enabled 
though technologies such as GaaS. Here is an 
illustration of how cross-market externalities affect 
our model. 
 
 
Figure 2. Illustration of the initial condition for the 
extended model: cross-market externality 
 
We update gamer utilities and the indifferent 
gamer equation for firm 𝑎 in period 2 becomes: 
 
 𝑢 − 𝛼𝑥𝑎 − 𝑝2
𝑎 + 𝑒ℎ𝑗𝑞1
𝑎 = 𝑢 − 𝛼(1 − 𝑥𝑎) − 𝑝2
𝑏 −
        𝑐𝑠 + 𝑒ℎ𝑗𝑞1
𝑏.  
 
Similarly, the indifferent gamer for firm 𝑏 in 
period 2 can be characterized as: 
 
𝑢 − 𝛼(1 − 𝑥𝑏) − 𝑝2
𝑏 + 𝑒ℎ𝑗𝑞1
𝑏 = 
𝑢 − 𝛼𝑥𝑏 − 𝑝2
𝑎 − 𝑐𝑠 + 𝑒ℎ𝑗𝑞1
𝑎 
 
Next, we solve the base model with the externality 
extension. 
 
With cross-market externalities, gamers will 
switch from firm 𝑎 to firm 𝑏 when 𝑐𝑠
𝑎 < 𝛼(2𝑥𝑎 −
1) + 𝑝2
𝑎 − 𝑝2
𝑏 + 𝑒ℎ𝑗(𝑞1
𝑏 − 𝑞1
𝑎). Similarly, firm b 
gamers switch to firm a when 𝑐𝑠
𝑏 < 𝛼(1 − 2𝑥𝑏) −
𝑝2
𝑎 + 𝑝2
𝑏 + 𝑒ℎ𝑗(𝑞1
𝑎 − 𝑞1
𝑏). 
 
We solve the profit maximization problem for 
prices and units sold similar to the previous section. 
Tracing the steps in section 3.1 with 𝑒ℎ𝑗 ∈ (0,1), we 
find that: 
 
𝑎 𝑏 
𝑞0
𝑏  𝑞0
𝑎  
0 1 
𝑎 𝑏 
𝑞0
𝑏  𝑞0
𝑎  
0 1 
G
am
e 1
 
𝑒1𝑗 > 0 
G
am
e j 
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(𝑞2
𝑎∗)𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠−𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡
𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
> (𝑞2
𝑎∗)𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 > 0 
 
(𝑝2
𝑎∗)𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠−𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡
𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
> (𝑝2
𝑎∗)𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 > 0 
 
Proposition 1: Cross-market externalities increase 
the benefits to the market leader in terms of quantities 
sold. 
 
Proposition 2: The market leader can charge a 
higher price in the presence of positive cross-market 
externalities without losing market share. 
 
Please note that these results only hold for the 
market share leader firm, because the externality 
effects across the periods conflict with the inter-
market externality effects for the follower firm. 
 
4. How to test findings empirically? 
 
Analytical models are very useful to define 
sterilized relationships between constructs. On the 
other hand, studies that utilize pure analytical 
modeling methodology may raise a healthy skepticism 
among the audience. This section is included to 
provide guidance, and outline, how the key parts of the 
analytical model presented in this paper could be 
tested empirically, and validated. 
 
First, it is essential to transform propositions in this 
study into testable (i.e. rejectable) assumptions or 
implications (hypotheses.) For example, proposition 1 
(Cross-market externalities increase the benefits to the 
market leader in terms of quantities sold) is a great 
candidate to become a measurable and testable 
hypothesis. The dependent variable “quantities sold” 
is already measured in most firms, and externalities 
could be measured through surveys or customer panels 
to understand customers’ utility and the role of 
network externality. Then, linear regression (or a more 
complex statistical method) could be used to validate 
the model. 
 
Second, the contribution and inferences drawn 
from the model and the empirical validation must be 
aligned. Particularly, inferences drawn from a 
potential empirical validation should be related to the 
inferences drawn from the model. 
 
Third, it may be useful to keep in mind that 
empirical findings might not validate the analytical 
model. This is a finding in itself. Researchers must be 
critical in their thinking. As aforementioned, 
analytical models help us investigate sterilized 
relationships between constructs, but reality is never 
sterile. If empirical tests show a different trend, it may 
be useful to investigate why and under which cases 
analytical findings hold, and when do they deviate. 
 
5. Conclusions  
 
Overall, in this study, we are investigating how 
GaaS firms can make pricing decisions to benefit from 
bundling and externalities to maximize game revenues 
and increase gamer utility. This question is, of course, 
multi-faceted. Drawing on the capabilities of 
analytical modeling, we have identified several related 
results, which currently interest theory and practice. 
They concern monetization strategies in GaaS market, 
and economic principles of game design. Our findings 
could also support business model design and strategic 
decision-making in practice. 
 
Advances in information technologies provided us 
with smart services that exhibit complex interactions. 
Cross-game externalities such as the ones in the 
Games as a Service (GaaS) enabled markets are an 
example of these complex properties. For example, 
making modular and connected GaaS offerings benefit 
from externalities. In our study, we developed a model 
incorporating both within-market and cross-game 
externality effects in an industry that has multiple 
games. To our knowledge, this is the first model about 
GaaS markets. Therefore, this study also contributes to 
the e-Commerce literature as the first analytical GaaS 
pricing model.  
 
On the other hand, practitioners in the GaaS 
enabled market are challenged in developing viable 
pricing models in such complex business scenarios. 
Practitioners currently use pricing models developed 
for conventional service models. This study offers a 
new approach, supported by a novel model, for pricing 
smart services enabled by GaaS. 
 
Our findings suggest that, even with the presence 
of positive and delayed network externalities in a 
gaming market, there is a solution for the optimal 
revenue. Moreover, we find that cross-market 
externalities provide opportunities for those firms who 
are willing to operationalize their pricing and market 
share strategies around them. Specifically, firms that 
are willing to identify cross-market externalities can 
benefit in terms of higher market share and prices. 
Perhaps firms such as Apple or Google have already 
benefited from externalities by instinctually creating 
ecosystems connected to games. If there is such a 
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phenomenon, we explain the rationale behind it with 
an analytical model.  
 
The main limitations of this research are due to the 
analytical modeling methodology we employed. First, 
arguments and propositions in this study have not been 
tested empirically and they are bound by the model 
assumptions. For example, we anticipated network 
externalities would be positive, which is aligned with 
the e-Commerce and economics literature [22, 23, 24]. 
However, in real life, we observe a diminishing rate of 
return for the externality effect, and even sometimes, 
it is negative. Indeed, an example of negative network 
externalities has been the departure of young social 
media users of Facebook games when parents became 
users and sent game play requests to their children.  
 
Finally, but maybe most importantly, data 
collected from such smart devices would lead to 
micro-segmentation and advanced marketing methods 
that would target individual gamers rather than wide 
segments. Analyzing the data collected from gaming 
devices, firms can direct promotions to extract a higher 
utility from gamers. To summarize, our model can be 
improved by considering synergies other than positive 
network externalities among the sides of a GaaS-
enabled smart services market. 
 
Each one of the limitations in this study provides 
an opportunity for a future research direction. First, in 
this study, we use a relatively simplified model of the 
network externality concept. Our model could be 
improved by considering a more sophisticated form 
(probably concave) externality function. Second, the 
model is based on two periods. Extending the time 
horizon to include multiple periods can provide 
additional insights into the impact of network 
externalities on gamers’ utility functions. Finally, as 
outlined in the previous section, validation of our 
findings creates an opportunity for an empirical study 
for the pricing of GaaS enabled markets. 
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